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Abstract 
Recent debates about “spheres of influence” in the context of the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights raised the question of whether companies’ human rights responsibilities arise, in part, 
from their leverage—their ability to influence the actions of others through their relationships. Special 
Representative John Ruggie rejected this proposition in the UN Framework for business and human 
rights. I argue, on the contrary, that leverage is a source of responsibility where there is a morally 
significant connection between the company and a rights-holder or rights-violator, the company is able 
to make an appreciable contribution to ameliorating the situation, it can do so at modest cost, and the 
threat to the rights-holder’s human rights is substantial. In such circumstances companies have a 
responsibility to exercise leverage even though they did nothing to contribute to the situation. Such 
responsibility is qualified, not categorical; graduated, not binary; context-specific; practicable; 
consistent with the specialized social role of business; and not merely a negative responsibility to 
avoid harm but a positive responsibility to do good. 
Keywords 
Corporate responsibility; business and human rights; ISO 26000; sphere of influence 

 1 
Introduction 
In the field of business and human rights, should a company’s “leverage” over other actors with whom 
it has a relationship—that is, its ability to influence their decisions or activities for better or worse—
give rise to responsibility, rendering it answerable for its exercise or failure to exercise such leverage? 
I argue that the answer is a qualified yes: leverage is one factor giving rise to responsibility in certain 
circumstances, even where the company is not itself contributing adverse human rights impacts. The 
case for leverage-based responsibility has not been articulated clearly in the scholarly literature. 
Instead this issue tends to be subsumed in debates about “sphere of influence” (SOI) and complicity, 
with which it overlaps only partially. One of the few commentators to address the question of leverage 
head-on is the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on business and human 
rights, Professor John Ruggie (“SRSG”), who explicitly rejected leverage as a basis for the business 
responsibility to respect human rights (United Nations 2008b: 18, 2008a). In this article I attempt to 
supply the missing normative argument in favour of a limited version of leverage-based responsibility 
and in the process answer the SRSG’s critique.  
To begin, it is necessary to distinguish three issues that are often obscured and even conflated in 
debates about corporate leverage and SOI: first, the relationship between companies’ impacts on 
human rights and their leverage over other actors (the impact/leverage distinction); second, the 
relationship between negative and positive forms of responsibility (the negative responsibility/positive 
responsibility distinction); and third, the relationship between companies’ human rights obligations 
and their optional efforts to support human rights (the obligatory/voluntary distinction). I examine 
these distinctions in the first section. Next, I provide a concrete context for my argument by narrating 
how the debate about leverage and SOI was brought into relief in the recent encounter between the 
SRSG’s three-part “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework (United Nations 2008b) and the 
International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 26000 guide on social responsibility 
(International Organization for Standardization 2010).  
I then turn to the normative case for leverage-based responsibility. I start by identifying some 
limitations of an impact-based conception of social responsibility. I then propose that leverage-based 
responsibility should arise when four criteria are satisfied: (a) there is a morally significant connection 
between the company and either the perpetrator of human rights abuse or the human rights-holder, (b) 
the company is able to make a difference to the state of affairs, (c) it can do so at an acceptable cost to 
itself, and (d) the actual or potential invasion of human rights at issue is sufficiently serious. I then 
argue that such responsibility (e) is qualified rather than categorical, (f) is a matter of degree rather 
than a binary choice, (g) is context-specific, (h) can be both negative and positive in character, (i) 
satisfies the practicality criterion, and (j) is appropriate to the specialized social function of business 
organizations. Ultimately, in my view, it is the relationship between the business organization and the 
rights-violator or the rights-holder, rather than the distinction between an organization’s impact and its 
leverage, that does the most moral work in establishing the scope of business responsibility in relation 
to human rights.  
Varieties of Responsibility 
Three interwoven distinctions are often obscured or conflated in the debate about corporate leverage 
and spheres of influence: influence as “impact” versus influence as “leverage,” negative versus 
positive responsibility, and obligatory versus optional human rights practices (Wood, 2011). To 
understand the debate it is necessary to tease apart these distinctions. First, as the SRSG points out, the 
concept of “sphere of influence” found in several leading international business and human rights 
initiatives conflates two very different meanings of “influence”:  
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One is “impact”, where the company’s activities or relationships are causing human rights harm. 
The other is whatever “leverage” a company may have over actors that are causing harm or could 
prevent harm. (United Nations 2008a: 5)  
A company has an impact where it causes or contributes to a social outcome, for example a violation 
of human rights. A company has leverage where it has the capacity to influence the activities or 
decisions of other actors through its relationships. These two forms of influence have different 
practical and moral implications, and correspond to two different conceptions of responsibility. 
Impact-based responsibility attaches to an organization’s direct and indirect contributions to social or 
environmental impacts. Leverage-based responsibility, by contrast, arises from an organization’s 
ability to influence the actions of other actors through its relationships, regardless of whether the 
impacts of those other actors’ actions can be traced to the organization. The business responsibility to 
respect human rights, as defined by the SRSG, is primarily impact-based. The SRSG rejected 
leverage-based responsibility in the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework (United Nations 2008b: 
18, 2008a), but as I will show, the final Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights endorse a 
limited version of leverage-based responsibility (United Nations 2011b). 
The second distinction needing attention is that between negative and positive responsibility. These 
terms have several possible meanings. I use them to distinguish a responsibility to “do good” (positive 
responsibility) from a responsibility to “do no harm” (negative responsibility) (Griffin 2004: 19). 
Together these two forms of responsibility make up the first precept of deontological ethics, traceable 
to Aquinas’s Summa Theologica: to do good and to avoid evil (Moore 2009: 34). They do not, 
however, equate with a responsibility to act and a responsibility not to act, as is often thought. The 
distinction between negative rights entailing negative obligations to refrain from certain actions, and 
positive rights entailing positive obligations to take action to fulfill the rights, is artificial and 
inconsistent with social reality. As Arnold points out, “it is not possible to protect a person from harm 
without taking proactive steps,” for example by designing, establishing, maintaining, staffing, 
financing and operating the necessary institutions:  
the protection of a prototypical negative right requires positive actions, and not merely the 
avoidance of particular actions. Since negative rights entail both negative and positive duties, the 
notion of negative vs. positive rights loses its meaning. There are only rights and corresponding 
obligations, but the obligations that correspond to these rights are both negative and positive. 
(2009: 65-66; see also Archard 2004: 48; Hsieh 2009)  
The business responsibility to respect human rights, as articulated by the SRSG, is a negative 
responsibility to avoid causing or contributing to human rights violations, rather than a positive 
responsibility to fulfill or support the realization of human rights. That said, the SRSG recognizes that 
negative responsibilities may require an actor to take affirmative steps to discharge its responsibility 
(not least, by conducting human rights due diligence) and that consequently a company can fail to 
discharge its responsibility by both omission and action (United Nations 2008b: 17, 2011b: 14).  
As I argue in detail elsewhere, the intersection of these two distinctions generates four types of 
social responsibility: 
1. Impact-based negative responsibility: Companies have the responsibility to avoid 
contributing to negative social or environmental impacts directly or through their relationships; 
2. Leverage-based negative responsibility: Companies have the responsibility to use their 
leverage to prevent or reduce the negative social or environmental impacts of other actors with 
whom they have relationships regardless of whether the companies themselves have 
contributed or are contributing to such impacts; 
3. Impact-based positive responsibility: Companies have the responsibility to contribute to 
positive social or environmental impacts directly or through their relationships; and 
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4. Leverage-based positive responsibility: Companies have the responsibility to use their 
leverage to increase or maximize the positive social or environmental impacts of other actors 
with whom they have relationships. (Wood, 2011) 
The SRSG’s framework for business and human rights endorses impact-based negative responsibility, 
leaves a little room for leverage-based negative responsibility, and rejects both forms of positive 
responsibility. I will argue in favour of all four varieties of responsibility.  
The third distinction at work in the debate about corporate leverage and spheres of influence is 
between companies’ inescapable human rights obligations and optional practices which organizations 
may choose or be encouraged to adopt. Some commentators, the SRSG included, suggest that 
exercising leverage to support or fulfill human rights is an optional matter, not an obligation 
(International Organization for Standardization 2010: clauses 5.2.3, 6.3.2.2; Sorell 2004: 140; United 
Nations 2010: 13, 2008a: 5). In this article I am concerned only with defining the boundaries of the 
obligations owed by business to society. Following Goodpaster, I define corporate responsibility as 
“the acknowledged or unacknowledged obligations that every company has as it pursues its economic 
objectives” (Goodpaster 2010: 126; see also Windsor 2004; Cragg 2010: 283-284). No one disagrees 
that organizations may as a discretionary matter, on a voluntary basis and subject to certain caveats, 
use their leverage to promote positive social or environmental outcomes, or prevent or mitigate 
negative outcomes. I will argue that in certain circumstances they have an obligation to do so.  
The “Sphere of Influence” Debate 
Emergence of the SOI Concept 
One of the abiding questions regarding corporate social responsibility is where to draw the boundaries 
of an organization’s responsibility when other actors with whom it is connected engage in human 
rights abuses or other socially irresponsible conduct. In what circumstances and to what degree, for 
example, should an apparel company be responsible for violations of workers’ rights in its suppliers’ 
factories; should a mining company be responsible for illegal killings by security forces contracted to 
protect its assets and personnel; should a battery manufacturer be responsible for contamination 
caused by leaching of toxins when its products are disposed improperly; should a firearms 
manufacturer be responsible when police use its products to shoot at citizens assembled peacefully; 
should banks be responsible when the proponents of projects they finance displace indigenous people 
forcibly; or should makers of fuels, solvents or adhesives be responsible when children sniff their 
products to get high?  
The concept of “sphere of influence” (SOI) was introduced into social responsibility discourse in 
2000 by the United Nations Global Compact in an effort to answer this question. The Global Compact 
urges member companies to embrace, support and enact ten principles of socially responsible conduct 
“within their sphere of influence” (United Nations Global Compact Office (no date)). According to 
Professor John Ruggie, the main drafter of the Global Compact before he became the SRSG, SOI can 
be a useful metaphor for thinking about a company’s responsibilities beyond the workplace (United 
Nations 2008a: 6). It provides an antidote to an excessively narrow conception of the business-human 
rights relationship. The concept of a “sphere” reflects two core propositions: first, that organizations 
have the ability, within certain limits, to influence actions and outcomes outside their own 
organizational boundaries through their relationships with other actors, and secondly, that business 
firms and states perform distinct social functions in distinct social domains, giving rise to distinct roles 
and responsibilities (de Schutter 2006: 12).  
The SOI is often depicted as a series of concentric circles with the organization’s workplace at the 
centre, followed by its supply chain, marketplace, the communities in which it operates, and finally an 
outermost sphere of government and politics (United Nations 2008a: 4). Variations of this approach 
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have been employed widely (e.g., Baab and Jungk 2009: 2; Business Leaders Initiative on Human 
Rights et al. 2006: 8; Gasser 2007: 10-13; BHP Billiton Ltd. 2006: 416-417). The model assumes that 
a company’s influence diminishes with distance from the centre of its sphere (United Nations 2008a: 
4). But what does “distance” mean in this context? Sphere of influence is often operationalized in 
terms of the “proximity” between the company, on one hand, and the (actual or potential) victims or 
perpetrators of human rights abuses, on the other (United Nations 2005a: 14). An online guide 
developed by the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, the Global Compact Office and the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights explains the proximity principle 
as follows: 
The closer a company is to actual or potential victims of human rights abuses, the greater will be 
its control and the greater will be the expectation on the part of stakeholders that the company is 
expected to support and respect the human rights of proximate populations. Similarly, the 
closeness of a company’s relationship with authorities or others that are abusing human rights may 
also determine the extent to which a company is expected by its stakeholders to respond to such 
abuse. (Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights et al. (no date); see also United Nations 
Global Compact Office and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2004: 17, 21)  
The sphere of influence approach was endorsed by the draft United Nations Norms on the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations in relation to human rights (United Nations 2003). 
Instead of using SOI in a hortatory manner, as the UN Global Compact did, the Norms purported to 
employ it in a literal sense to define corporate obligations, saying: “Within their respective spheres of 
activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to 
promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights” (United Nations 
2003: Article A.1). The potential significance of this direct, obligatory application of the SOI concept 
was magnified by two facts: first, that the Norms defined corporate responsibility as including positive 
obligations to protect, promote and secure the fulfilment of human rights, not just a negative 
responsibility to avoid violating them; and second, that the corporate human rights obligations 
identified by the Norms were of the same general type and scope as those of States, leaving the 
concept of “spheres of activity and influence” to do most of the work to distinguish between them.  
SOI was one issue in the broader debate that emerged around the Draft Norms. For present 
purposes it suffices to note that some governments and business groups rejected the Norms’ SOI 
approach vehemently while many human rights organizations and a number of leading socially 
conscious companies endorsed it. The Business Leaders’ Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR), 
comprising top executives from some of the leading transnational companies in the field of CSR, 
supported the Norms, piloting the SOI approach in member companies and cooperating with the 
Global Compact Office and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to develop guidance on 
implementing it. 
In 2004 the UN Human Rights Commission welcomed the Draft Norms, but noted that as a draft, 
they had no legal standing. It asked the Office of the High Commissioner to prepare a report on 
existing standards related to business and human rights that would identify outstanding issues and 
make recommendations for strengthening such standards and their implementation (cite Commission 
decision 2004/116 of 20 April 2004). The resulting 2005 report endorsed the use of the sphere of 
influence concept to define the boundaries of business responsibility for human rights. Noting that the 
concept sets limits on responsibility according to a business entity’s power to act, it concluded that it 
could “help clarify the boundaries of responsibilities of business entities in relation to other entities in 
the supply chain...by guiding an assessment of the degree of influence that one company exerts over a 
partner in its contractual relationship—and therefore the extent to which it is responsible for the acts or 
omissions of a subsidiary or a partner down the supply chain” (United Nations 2005a: 14). The High 
Commissioner also concluded that the SOI concept should help draw boundaries between the 
responsibilities of States and businesses, and to ensure that small businesses “are not forced to 
undertake over-burdensome human rights responsibilities, but only responsibilities towards people 
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within their limited sphere of influence” (United Nations 2005a: 14). The report recommended that the 
Commission consider and further develop the SOI concept.  
The Commission welcomed the High Commissioner’s report and requested that the UN Secretary-
General appoint a Special Representative on business and human rights for an initial period of two 
years, with a mandate to “identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability 
for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights” (United 
Nations 2005b: para. 1(a)). One of the SRSG’s tasks would be to clarify the implications of the 
concept of sphere of influence (United Nations 2005b: para. 1(c)).  
The SRSG’s Rejection of SOI 
In his early research, the SRSG found that many companies’ human rights policies and practices 
mirror the Global Compact’s sphere of influence model (United Nations 2007: 21), and that its 
assumption of responsibility declining gradually as one moves outward from the workplace “appears 
to reflect an emerging consensus view among leading companies” (United Nations 2006: 10). He 
nevertheless rejected the use of SOI to define the scope of the business responsibility for human rights. 
He concluded that “while sphere of influence remains a useful metaphor for companies to think 
broadly about their human rights responsibilities and opportunities beyond the workplace, it is of 
limited utility in clarifying the specific parameters of their responsibility to respect human rights” 
(United Nations 2008a: 6; see also Ruggie 2007: 825-826; 2008: 202-203).  
The SRSG argued that while the SOI concept may have sufficed when the Global Compact was 
first introduced, companies now needed a clearer and more precise guide to their responsibilities, 
especially after SOI was incorporated in the draft UN Norms (United Nations 2008a: 5). First, the SOI 
concept’s conflation of “influence as impact” with “influence as leverage” was problematic because 
imposing responsibility whenever a company has leverage would require assuming, inappropriately, 
that “can implies ought” (United Nations 2008a: 5). The SRSG concluded, to the contrary, that 
“companies cannot be held responsible for the human rights impacts of every entity over which they 
may have some leverage, because this would include cases in which they are not contributing to, nor 
are a causal agent of the harm in question” (United Nations 2008a: 5). Moreover, requiring companies 
to act wherever they have leverage would invite political interference and strategic manipulation 
(United Nations 2008a: 5-6, 2008b: 20; Ruggie 2007: 826). 
The SRSG also took issue with the tendency to operationalize SOI in terms of “proximity”, asking:  
What constitutes “political proximity”, for example? The most intuitive meaning of proximity—
geographic—can be misleading. Clearly, companies need to be concerned with their impact on 
workers and surrounding communities, but their activities can equally affect the rights of people 
far away from the source, as, for example, violations of privacy rights by Internet service providers 
can endanger dispersed end-users. (United Nations 2008a: 6; see also de Schutter 2006: 12). 
The SRSG concluded that “it is not proximity that determines whether or not a human rights impact 
falls within the responsibility to respect, but rather the company’s web of activities and relationships” 
(United Nations 2008a: 6). He summed up his analysis of SOI as follows:  
the scope of due diligence to meet the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is not a 
fixed sphere, nor is it based on influence. Rather, it depends on the potential and actual human 
rights impacts resulting from a company’s business activities and the relationships connected to 
those activities. (United Nations 2008a: 8).  
The SRSG also rejected the Norms’ contention that corporate human rights responsibility has both 
negative (“do no harm”) and positive dimensions (“do good”). In his three-part Protect, Respect and 
Remedy framework unveiled in April, 2008, only States have positive duties to protect, promote and 
contribute to the fulfillment of human rights, whereas the business responsibility to respect human 
rights is a negative responsibility to avoid infringing human rights (United Nations 2008b). The 
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United Nations Human Rights Council welcomed the SRSG’s reports and extended his mandate for a 
further three years to elaborate and operationalize the framework (United Nations 2008c). As a result 
of this endorsement, the SRSG’s three-part Protect, Respect and Remedy framework is widely referred 
to as the “UN framework”. 
In short, according to the SRSG, the UN Norms, positive responsibility, sphere of influence and 
leverage were “out” as bases for defining business human rights responsibilities, while impacts and 
negative responsibility were “in”. This did not mean, however, that leverage was irrelevant. His 2008 
reports and his 2010 follow-up report on elaborating and operationalizing the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy framework, while rejecting leverage as a basis for defining the scope of responsibility, 
emphasized that responsibility arises not only from the impacts of a company’s own decisions and 
activities, but also from the impacts of its relationships. His 2010 report put it this way:  
Scope is defined by the actual and potential human rights impacts generated through a company’s 
own business activities and through its relationships with other parties…. (United Nations 2010: 
13)  
The SRSG thus contemplated responsibility arising in situations where the company itself was not 
contributing to negative impacts, but its relationships were. Responsibility in such circumstances 
would attach to the company’s ability to influence other actors’ contributions to negative impacts 
through its relationships rather than to its own contribution to such impacts, since such contribution is 
absent. This opens the door to a leverage-based conception of responsibility.  
SOI and the drafting of ISO 26000 
The SRSG’s scepticism and the apparent demise of the draft UN Norms notwithstanding, the SOI 
approach remained very much alive in international CSR discourse and practice. Around the time that 
the UN Human Rights Commissioner issued her 2005 report embracing and recommending further 
investigation of the SOI concept (United Nations 2005a), the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) was beginning the contentious work of drafting an international guidance 
standard for social responsibility. ISO, a federation of the national standards bodies of approximately 
160 countries, is the leading source of voluntary consensus standards for business (Murphy and Yates 
2009). In 2004, ISO members decided to develop an ISO standard for social responsibility, applicable 
to organizations of all kinds. The standard was developed by the ISO Working Group on Social 
Responsibility (WGSR), a multi-stakeholder body made up, ultimately, of 450 representatives of 
business, labour, government, NGOs and other interests from 99 ISO member countries and 42 
international organizations including the International Labour Organization, the UN Global Compact 
Office, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the International Organization of Employers, the International Trade Union 
Confederation, the Global Reporting Initiative, the International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, Social Accountability International, Transparency International 
and the Fair Labor Association (International Organization for Standardization n.d.). Notably, while 
business and labour were well represented, no major international human rights organizations 
participated directly in the negotiations.  
The WGSR began its work in 2005. Sphere of influence featured prominently in its drafts from the 
start, drawing on the Global Compact, the draft UN Norms and other sources. After several rounds of 
drafting, a near-final version known as a Draft International Standard (DIS) was circulated for ballot 
among ISO member bodies in late 2009 (International Organization for Standardization 2009). The 
DIS was circulated more than a year after the SRSG published his views on sphere of influence and 
“leverage”. Yet it continued to give the SOI concept a central role. In several passages it endorsed the 
view that leverage over other actors can give rise to responsibility, and that the greater an 
organization’s leverage, the greater its responsibility. For example: 
An Argument for Leverage-Based Business Responsibility for Human Rights 
7 
An organization cannot be held responsible for the impacts of every party over which it may have 
some influence. However, there will be situations where an organization’s ability to influence 
others will be accompanied by a responsibility to exercise that influence…. Generally, the 
responsibility for exercising influence increases with the ability to influence. (ibid., clause 5.2.3; 
see also 7.3.2) 
Numerous other passages reinforced this message. The clause on labour practices proclaimed that an 
organization “should make reasonable efforts to encourage organizations in its sphere of influence to 
follow responsible labour practices, recognizing that a high level of influence is likely to correspond to 
a high level of responsibility to exercise that influence” (ibid., clause 6.4.3.2). On the issue of child 
labour the DIS stated that “If an organization has child labour in its…sphere of influence, it should 
ensure not only that the children are removed from work, but also that they are provided with 
appropriate alternatives” (ibid., clause 6.3.10.2). The section on environment urged organizations to 
take action to improve the environmental performance of others within its sphere of influence, 
including by stimulating water conservation, identifying ways to increase the efficiency of raw 
material use, implementing measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and seeking to prevent the 
use of certain toxic chemicals by organizations within its sphere of influence (ibid., clause 6.5).  
The tension between these passages and the SRSG’s position on sphere of influence was evident, 
and did not escape his attention. In November, 2009, he sent a letter to the WGSR expressing concern 
about the DIS’s treatment of leverage and sphere of influence (United Nations 2009). While 
acknowledging that the use of the sphere of influence concept in the human rights portion of ISO 
26000 (clause 6.3) was broadly consistent with the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, he 
cautioned that its use in the rest of the document was not. In his opinion,  
The draft Guidance is internally inconsistent on this issue, and beyond the human rights section it 
is inconsistent with the UN framework. This will send mixed and confusing messages to 
companies seeking to understand their social responsibilities, and to stakeholders seeking to hold 
them to account. (United Nations 2009: 2) 
In the rest of the short letter the SRSG reiterated his main concerns about leverage and sphere of 
influence from his 2008 report on sphere of influence and complicity (summarized above), and urged 
the working group to bring the Guide into closer alignment with the Protect, Respect and Remedy 
framework.  
The WGSR leadership took the SRSG’s advice, substantially rewriting the definition of sphere of 
influence and the main clauses elaborating upon the concept in consultation with the SRSG’s team. 
Many references to responsibility arising from and increasing with the ability to influence other actors’ 
decisions and activities (influence as “leverage”) were removed, and replaced with a stronger 
emphasis on influence as “impact”. The changes were endorsed by the WGSR at its last meeting in 
Copenhagen in 2010, and later that year the final version of ISO 26000 was approved by a large 
majority of ISO member bodies and published (International Organization for Standardization 2010). 
Influence and leverage in the final version of ISO 26000 
Despite these last minute changes, influence and leverage continue to feature prominently in the 
published version of ISO 26000. The term “sphere of influence” appears 34 times in the Guide and is 
integral to its definition of and approach to social responsibility (Wood, 2011). ISO 26000 defines 
sphere of influence unequivocally in terms of leverage, as the “range/extent of political, contractual, 
economic or other relationships through which an organization has the ability to affect the decisions or 
activities of individuals or organizations” (International Organization for Standardization 2010: clause 
2.19). It goes on immediately to say, however, that leverage does not, in itself, imply a responsibility 
to exercise influence and that the term “sphere of influence” should always be understood in the 
context of two clauses (5.2.3 and 7.3.2) that were revised in light of the SRSG’s comments (ibid., 
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clause 2.19). Those clauses provide guidance on sources and types of influence. They describe the 
relationship between leverage and responsibility as follows:  
An organization does not always have a responsibility to exercise influence purely because it has 
the ability to do so. For instance, it cannot be held responsible for the impacts of other 
organizations over which it may have some influence if the impact is not a result of its decisions 
and activities. However, there will be situations where an organization will have a responsibility to 
exercise influence. These situations are determined by the extent to which an organization's 
relationship is contributing to negative impacts. (Ibid., clause 5.2.3) 
Emphasizing that organizations have a choice about the kinds of relationships they enter, the Guide 
warns that “There will be situations where an organization has the responsibility to be alert to the 
impacts created by the decisions and activities of other organizations and to take steps to avoid or to 
mitigate the negative impacts connected to its relationship with such organizations” (ibid.).  
What about situations where an organization’s relationships are not contributing to negative 
impacts? In such circumstances, ISO 26000 notes that an organization “may wish, or be asked” to 
exercise leverage voluntarily, and that it “can exercise its influence with others either to enhance 
positive impacts on sustainable development, or to minimize negative impacts, or both” (ibid., clauses 
5.2.3, 7.3.2). The combined effect of these two clauses is to suggest that responsibility arises when the 
organization’s decisions, activities or relationships contribute to negative human rights impacts, and 
beyond this there is no responsibility to exercise leverage. In this respect ISO 26000 is aligned with 
the SRSG’s framework. 
The human rights clause of ISO 26000 (clause 6.3) follows the same logic. It urges organizations to 
respect the human rights of those on whom they can have an impact, and to ensure that they are not 
contributing to human rights violations through the relationships connected to their activities (ibid., 
clause 6.3.7.2) To surpass this “baseline responsibility” and contribute to the fulfillment of human 
rights is an optional opportunity, not a responsibility (ibid.). While the concept of SOI can help an 
organization understand the extent of this opportunity, ISO 26000 warns that exercising leverage can 
also have negative or unintended consequences (ibid., clause 6.3.2.2). 
Other parts of ISO 26000, however, embody a broader conception of responsibility. Some of these 
suggest that business responsibility is not just negative but also positive, contrary to the SRSG’s 
formulation. The clause on general principles of social responsibility calls upon organizations, for 
example, to “respect and, where possible, promote” fundamental human rights and insists that the 
“overarching objective” of an organization when implementing SR is “to maximize its contribution to 
sustainable development” (ibid., clauses 4.1 and 4.8). Business has a responsibility, in other words, to 
“do good,” not merely to avoid doing harm. Even the human rights clause contains references to 
positive responsibility, despite the efforts to align it with the SRSG’s framework. Clause 6.3.4 on 
human rights risk situations urges organizations to base their decisions on the responsibility to respect 
“while also contributing to promoting and defending the overall fulfilment of human rights” (ibid., 
clause 6.3.4.2). Clause 6.3.7 on anti-discrimination says that organizations should engage in 
affirmative action, support efforts to increase marginalized groups’ access to education, infrastructure 
and social services, promote gender equality, contribute to disabled people’s enjoyment of dignity, 
autonomy and full participation in society, and promote respect for the rights of migrant workers 
(ibid., clause 6.3.7.2). Finally, clause 6.3.10 on labour rights calls on organizations to make efforts to 
advance vulnerable groups and eliminate child labour (ibid., clause 6.3.10.3).  
Other passages of ISO 26000 suggest that leverage can give rise to responsibility even in the 
absence of contribution to negative impacts. Such responsibility takes three forms. Firstly, in some 
circumstances an organization may have a responsibility to contribute to solving problems caused by 
others. Where actors with whom it has a relationship are causing negative impacts, an organization 
may have a responsibility to exercise its leverage to prevent or remedy such impacts. For example, 
ISO 26000 urges organizations to take action to reduce and minimize pollution, prevent the use of 
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certain toxic chemicals, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by organizations within their sphere of 
influence (ibid. clauses 6.5.3.2, 6.5.5.2.1).  
Secondly, organizations may have a responsibility to exercise their leverage to promote positive 
outcomes. The clause on fair operating practices uses these very words, urging organizations to use 
their relationships with other organizations to promote positive outcomes by “promoting the adoption 
of social responsibility more broadly throughout the organization’s sphere of influence,” encouraging 
the development of public policies that benefit society at large, and raising the awareness of 
organizations with which they have relationships about principles and issues of social responsibility 
(ibid., clauses 6.6.1.2, 6.6.4 and 6.6.6). Clause 7.4.3 on integrating SR into an organization states that 
“an organization should ... monitor the impacts of the organizations within its sphere of influence, so 
as to minimize the risk of social and environmental harm, as well as maximize opportunities and 
positive impacts”. A passage on labour practices even asserts, contrary to the clauses on SOI discussed 
earlier, that “a high level of influence is likely to correspond to a high level of responsibility to 
exercise that influence” (clause 6.4.3.2).  
Thirdly, an organization may have a responsibility to refrain from exercising its leverage in 
particular ways, regardless of whether such exercise would have any impact. Thus organizations 
should not engage in misinformation, intimidation, threats, efforts to control politicians, or other 
activity that can undermine the public political process, regardless of whether such nefarious activity 
actually bears fruit (ibid., clause 6.6.4). Similarly it is irresponsible to offer bribes or engage in other 
corrupt practices regardless of whether such bribes are accepted or such illicit efforts at influencing 
others’ decisions and activities succeed (ibid., clause 6.6.3). In these cases it is the exercise of leverage 
itself, rather than contribution to impacts, that attracts responsibility. 
In short, the published version of ISO 26000 contains a mix of negative, positive, impact-based and 
leverage-based responsibility, although the passages on human rights tend to emphasize the negative, 
impact-based variety (Wood, 2011). In this respect it is more like the UN Global Compact, which 
exhorts companies to “embrace, support and enact” the ten principles within their spheres of influence, 
than the UN Framework, which defines the business responsibility for human rights as negative and 
based on contribution to impacts. 
Influence and Leverage in the SRSG’s Guiding Principles 
In March, 2011, the SRSG submitted his final report to the UN Human Rights Council (United 
Nations 2011b). The report proposes Guiding Principles for implementing the three part “protect, 
respect and remedy” framework articulated in the SRSG’s earlier reports. What is most interesting 
about the Guiding Principles for present purposes is their acknowledgement that a company may be 
responsible for human rights violations to which it has not contributed. The Guiding Principles 
confirm that business enterprises have a responsibility to “avoid causing or contributing to adverse 
human rights impacts through their own activities” (United Nations 2011b: 14). This is a 
straightforward statement of impact-based responsibility. They go on, however, to say that companies 
may also be responsible for adverse human rights impacts to which they did not contribute:  
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises: ... Seek to prevent or 
mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or 
services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts. (Ibid., 
14, emphasis added) 
The operational guidance provided by the Principles distinguishes between three scenarios: where a 
business enterprise causes or may cause an adverse human rights impact, where it contributes or may 
contribute to an adverse human rights impact, and where it “has not contributed to an adverse human 
rights impact, but that impact is nevertheless directly linked to its operations, products or services by 
its business relationship” (ibid., 18). In other words, in the Guiding Principles a company’s 
responsibility is not defined solely by its contribution to impacts. Companies have a responsibility to 
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prevent or mitigate negative human rights impacts to which they have not contributed, if these impacts 
are “directly linked” to the company via its business relationships. As I noted earlier, in such 
circumstances responsibility must attach to the company’s ability to influence other actors through its 
relationships, since the company is not making any contribution to negative impacts. In this way, the 
Guiding Principles embrace a modest version of leverage-based responsibility. 
The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles enthusiastically in a June, 2011 
resolution co-sponsored by several countries and supported almost unanimously by Council members 
(United Nations 2011a). With the Special Representative’s work done, the Council’s focus will turn 
now to promoting the effective and comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the UN 
Framework and Guiding Principles. Elaborating the circumstances in which the link between a 
company and a negative human rights impact is sufficiently “direct” to give rise to responsibility even 
where the company has not contributed to the impact will be one of the issues requiring attention as 
this work proceeds.  
Concluding remarks about the leverage/SOI debate 
ISO 26000 was transformed much more by its encounter with the SRSG and the UN Framework than 
either of the latter were by their encounter with ISO 26000. The ISO guide was modified substantially 
in an effort to bring it into closer alignment with the UN Framework’s treatment of leverage and 
sphere of influence. Yet the concept of “sphere of influence” continues to be central to ISO 26000’s 
approach to social responsibility, and all four varieties of responsibility—negative, positive, impact-
based and leverage-based—are reflected in the guide. And while the SRSG’s insistence on defining 
the business responsibility to respect human rights as negative and impact-based remained firm, his 
notion of a “web of relationships” and his proposition that a company may be responsible for human 
rights impacts to which it did not contribute open the door to a leverage-based conception of 
responsibility.  
The Case for Leverage-Based Responsibility 
Insofar as the SRSG’s Guiding Principles on business and human rights move toward accepting 
leverage-based responsibility, they make a step in the right direction but do not go far enough. A 
comprehensive leverage-based conception of responsibility is needed. I make three assumptions for 
purposes of this argument. The first is that business organizations bear responsibilities to society other 
than to maximize returns to their owners. While this assumption still has its critics, it is shared widely 
by the UN framework, ISO 26000 and many commentators, and I do not intend to question it here. 
The second assumption is that the moral case of the individual can be projected onto the organization 
for purposes of social responsibility. Such projection raises difficult issues but is sufficiently accepted 
in the social responsibility and business ethics literature that it provides a workable starting-point, 
provided that certain morally relevant differences between organizations and individuals are borne in 
mind (Archard 2004: 55; Palmer 2004: 69; Voiculescu 2007: 412-418; Goodpaster 2010: 131). 
My third assumption is that responsibility is individual rather than collective—that is (keeping in 
mind my second assumption, above), it attaches to individual organizations rather than to groups of 
organizations whose actions collectively advance or infringe human rights or environmental integrity. 
Many commentators, the SRSG included (Ruggie 2007: 839), have noted the inadequacy of 
individualist accounts of responsibility in view of the often collective, networked character of human 
rights violations and other social evils (e.g. Kutz 2000; Voiculescu 2007; Weissbrodt 2008: 387; 
Wettstein 2010c; Young 2004). A collective theory of responsibility may ultimately be necessary to 
respond to this reality. In this article, however, I confine myself to exploring how we might address 
this challenge within an individualist conception of responsibility. 
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One further caveat is in order. My defence of leverage-based responsibility should not be mistaken 
for a defence of the concept of sphere of influence. Like the SRSG, I consider the spatial metaphor of 
nested spheres radiating out from the workplace inapt and potentially misleading, and its tendency to 
conflate “influence as impact” with “influence as leverage” unhelpful. It should be replaced with a 
metaphor that is truer to social reality, such as the “web of activities and relationships” suggested by 
the SRSG himself. As we will see, this metaphor aligns well with my argument in favour of leverage-
based responsibility. 
The limitations of impact-based responsibility 
The moral case for impact-based responsibility is strong, and widely accepted in the corporate social 
responsibility and business ethics literatures. It is based on the moral intuition that we are responsible 
for the results of our own actions, barring exceptional situations such as incapacity or involuntariness 
(Moore 2009: 30-33 and 95; Hart and Honoré 1985: 63-65). Our degree of culpability (e.g. intending 
or recklessly risking a result versus bringing about unforeseen results by mistake) and of contribution 
(e.g. being a necessary and sufficient cause vs. a substantial factor, or making a causal contribution vs. 
non-causally occasioning an outcome) may affect the degree of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness 
attached to our conduct, but the “ethical bottom-line,” as Wiggen and Bomann-Larsen put it, “is 
simple: you are responsible for the actual harm you cause or contribute to, no matter where you 
operate” (Wiggen and Bomann-Larsen 2004: 7). 
An impact-based account of responsibility must overcome two challenges: unintended side effects 
and interactive social outcomes. The first challenge arises where an actor’s decisions and activities 
bring about negative results that the actor did not intend. The principle of double effect offers one 
response to this challenge. Under this venerable doctrine, actors have a responsibility to prevent 
unintended but foreseeable side-effects and take measures to minimize the harm caused (Bomann-
Larsen 2004: 91). Action that produces harmful side-effects is nevertheless permissible provided that 
the primary goal of the action is legitimate, the side-effects are neither part of the end sought by the 
actor nor means to this end, the actor aims to prevent or minimize them, and no alternative courses of 
action are available that would result in fewer or no side-effects (Wiggen and Bomann-Larsen 2004: 
5). The issue of unintended side-effects, however important for business ethics, is not relevant to this 
article because regardless of how one treats them, both the problem and its solution fall clearly within 
the domain of impact-based responsibility (Wiggen and Bomann-Larsen 2004: 10-11). Leverage does 
not enter the picture. 
The second challenge facing impact-based responsibility is the prevalence of interactive social 
outcomes. Many social and environmental conditions are the products of complex social interactions 
in which chains of causation are long and convoluted, outcomes are not within the control of 
individual actors, and contributions are difficult or impossible to tease apart. This does not fit well 
with a traditional conception of moral responsibility according to which “one can only be held 
responsible for that over which one has control” (Beckmann and Pies 2008: 91). This criterion of 
individual outcome control is an instantiation of the maxim “ought implies can”: “you can only have a 
moral obligation if it is causally possible for you to carry it out” (Banerjee et al. 2006: 313). If we 
were to apply this criterion rigidly to require individual control of social outcomes as a condition for 
moral responsibility, no one would be responsible for many outcomes in today’s complex world.  
One response to this problem is to relax the requirement of causation. This can be done in two 
ways. First, the required causal relation between the agent’s conduct and the outcome might be diluted 
from “but-for” causation to “substantial factor” or some otherwise lowered threshold of causal 
contribution (Moore 2009: 105, 300). Secondly, contribution can be defined in non-causal terms. 
Moral responsibility can and often does arise in the absence of causal contribution. Examples of non-
causal contributions to undesirable outcomes that may in the right circumstances give rise to moral 
responsibility include omissions or neglect (in which the operative relationship is one of 
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counterfactual dependence rather than causation), culpable imposition of risk (in which the operative 
relationship is probabilistic dependence rather than causation), and culpable but unsuccessful efforts to 
do harm (Hart and Honoré 1985: xlv-xlvi, 63-65; Moore 2009: 54-55, 307-311, 314-317, 444-451; 
Soule et al. 2009: 541-543).  
The UN framework reflects both of these general strategies: it rejects a narrow focus on causation 
in favour of “causing or contributing” (United Nations 2008a: 6, 2011b), and it embraces both causal 
and non-causal forms of contribution. To be precise, it emphasizes causal contributions, in the form of 
the direct and indirect impacts of companies’ own decisions and operations (e.g., United Nations 
2008b: 20). But it contemplates responsibility for both actions and omissions, and includes such non-
causal contributions as failing to conduct human rights impact assessments, failing to integrate human 
rights policies throughout a company, failing to monitor human rights performance, and silently 
encouraging or legitimizing human rights abuses (United Nations 2008a: 12, 2008b: 18-19, 21, 2010: 
17, 2011b: 14). To be clear, responsibility for omissions is non-causal: an omission does not cause the 
outcome it failed to prevent (Moore 2009: 54-55, 444-451). The Framework also addresses potential 
human rights impacts using the language of risk and prevention, which appears to imply a non-causal 
theory of responsibility (United Nations 2011b: 16-17).  
Relaxing the causation requirement has the advantage of recognizing that causation is scalar, a 
matter of continuous variation (Moore 2009: 300), and that non-causal contributions can be morally 
relevant. It allows responsibility to reach beyond the narrow case of but-for causation, and to be 
graduated to reflect different kinds and degrees of contribution, causal and non-causal. It does not, 
however, allow responsibility to be imposed in cases where it is impossible to determine individual 
contributions. Under this approach, if no contribution can be established, there is no responsibility.  
Some might say that this is as it should be: no one should be held responsible for a state of affairs 
to which he or she did not contribute, causally or otherwise. But individual responsibility can arise in 
the absence of contribution to outcomes, causal or otherwise. Leading examples are role-based 
responsibilities such as that of a principal for harm caused by an agent, a parent for the actions of a 
minor, an occupier of property for injuries sustained by visitors, or a captain for the safety of a ship 
(Hart 1967, 2008; Gibson 2007: 99-100). Another is the responsibility to come to the aid of someone 
in peril given the right circumstances, an issue to which I will return. All of these are premised on a 
morally significant relationship between the moral agent and the person causing or suffering harm. In 
any event, the Guiding Principles themselves recognize that responsibility should sometimes arise 
where an organization is neither causing nor contributing to human rights harm (United Nations 
2011b: 14, 18-19). 
A second response to the problem of interactive social outcomes, which often accompanies the 
first, is to characterize responsibility as qualified rather than categorical. Faced with the lack of 
individual outcome control, an actor’s responsibility should be defined in terms of what he or she can 
control—making an effort—rather than what he or she cannot—achieving a particular result. In such a 
scenario, “even if a company does not have a categorical responsibility, a responsibility to resolve the 
moral challenge on its own, it can still have a qualified responsibility to make an effort—or to 
participate in the efforts of others in seeking a collaborative resolution” (Goodpaster 2010: 147). This 
satisfies the “ought implies can” maxim by defining the moral responsibility in terms of actions a firm 
can achieve by itself. Again, this is the general approach taken by the UN Framework: the 
responsibility to respect human rights is not a categorical responsibility to avoid infringing human 
rights in any circumstances, it is a qualified responsibility to exercise due diligence to avoid infringing 
them. Qualified responsibility is justified in the complex arena of social responsibility where agency is 
often diffuse and interdependent, and causal pathways hard to trace.  
A third response is to make actors responsible for the institutional order in which interactions 
occur, rather than for specific interaction outcomes. In this approach, individual actors are responsible 
for contributing to the creation of the institutional order within which interaction occurs and for 
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participating in a discourse aimed at identifying shared interests (Beckmann and Pies 2008; Pies et al. 
2009; Ulrich 2008). Social interaction outcomes remain no one’s responsibility, except in the rare 
cases where individual outcome control exists. This approach is unsatisfactory insofar as it deflects 
attention from where it ought to be, on responsibility for the actual outcomes of social interaction.  
In conclusion, impact-based responsibility works most easily where a causal connection can be 
established between an agent’s actions and the effects felt by others. It applies, for example, where a 
company fires employees it suspects of agitating in favour of unionization. In this situation the causal 
impact of the company’s action on the employees’ rights is direct and clear. It also applies where a 
company insists on keeping the prices paid to its suppliers as low as possible, and this insistence 
contributes to a supplier’s decision to require its employees to work uncompensated overtime, in an 
effort to cut its costs. In this situation the first company’s action has an indirect impact, as one causal 
factor (possibly among many) contributing to the second company’s decision. So long as the first 
company’s contribution rises above some de minimus threshold, the company will bear responsibility 
for the harm commensurate with its degree of contribution and culpability. Impact-based responsibility 
can also apply to cases of non-causal contribution such as omissions and riskings, by broadening what 
we mean by “contribution”.  
Even with this expansion, a wide variety of situations where harm is being suffered, or good could 
be done, escape the application of impact-based responsibility because it is impossible to determine 
individual contributions to outcomes. The only answer impact-based responsibility offers in these 
situations is that no one is responsible. To say that this is justified because contribution is a 
prerequisite for responsibility fails to recognize that responsibility can and does arise in the absence 
not just of causal contribution, but of contribution of any kind. Such situations call for finer-grained 
moral judgments. Some actors are more closely connected to such situations than others, some act in 
more blameworthy ways than others, and some have more opportunities to act than others. We need a 
theory of responsibility that allows us to make these kinds of distinctions. Leverage-based 
responsibility is one such theory. 
Power and responsibility 
The kernel of a leverage-based approach is the proposition that, in some circumstances where a 
company is making no causal or other contribution to a state of affairs, it has a responsibility to 
exercise its leverage over actors with whom it has relationships in an effort to improve that state of 
affairs. Lack of contribution may not rule out a responsibility to contribute. The same idea can be 
expressed in terms of impact: even where a company is having no impact, it may have an obligation to 
try to have an impact by exercising its leverage over others. The question in such cases is not “are we 
contributing?” but “could we contribute?” If a company is not part of the problem, should it 
nevertheless be part of the solution? 
The case for leverage-based responsibility starts with the fact of the substantial power of business 
enterprises to influence social conditions, including the enjoyment of human rights (e.g., Sorell 2004: 
138; Wiggen and Bomann-Larsen 2004; Moon et al. 2008). This power is widely believed to be 
increasing under contemporary conditions of globalization, while the capacity of governments to 
protect human rights is under strain (e.g., Cragg 2004, 2010; Scherer et al. 2009). In many cases 
corporations have substantial influence over people’s material well-being; in some cases they exercise 
government-like functions, providing such public goods as education, security and health care; in rare 
cases they have the ability to determine life and death. Not only do they have substantial impacts on 
society and environment, they often have the leverage to make a difference, for better or worse, to 
problems not strictly of their own making. Sorell’s description is apt:  
The claim that businesses have obligations to protect and promote human rights is controversial, 
but the claim that they have opportunities to do so is not. ... Businesses, especially big businesses, 
are influential, and governments that rely on their investment for economic development, or even 
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for corrupt personal enrichment, will not be unwilling to listen to what businesses have to say 
about a wide range of topics, including human rights. (Sorell 2004: 129) 
What are the moral implications of this power? What is the relation between companies’ size, 
resources and leverage, on one hand, and their human rights obligations, on the other? This is, as 
Sorell notes, “perhaps rhetorically and practically the hardest thing to get clear about when one 
discusses the human rights obligations of companies” (Sorell 2004: 138). 
At the highest level of generalization, we might assert that with corporate power comes 
responsibility (Bowen 1953; Bowie 1991; Windsor 2001; Wiggen and Bomann-Larsen 2004: 3; 
Scherer and Palazzo 2007; Kobrin 2009: 350). According to Cragg, “With the power of corporations 
to impact the enjoyment of human rights on the part of those affected by their operations comes the 
responsibility to protect and respect human rights in the exercise of that power” (Cragg 2010: 288). 
Some commentators go farther, arguing not just that power must be exercised responsibly but that 
there may be a responsibility to exercise power. Campbell identifies companies’ capacities, “that is, 
their ability and opportunity to make a difference to fundamental human interests within and beyond 
their own core sphere of activity,” as one factor defining their human rights responsibilities, and 
asserts that “concentrating on what it is that different sorts of organisation are capable of achieving 
gives us a fruitful basis for looking not only to where the duties correlative to human rights may fall, 
but what those duties may actually be” (Campbell 2004a: 15-16). Sorell argues that “when businesses 
have the opportunity to promote or protect human rights where they operate, they are often also 
obliged to do so” (Sorell 2004: 130). Griffin argues that “accidental facts such as being in a position to 
help can impose moral responsibilities—and nothing more special to the situation may bring the 
responsibility than that” (Griffin 2004: 39). Do these observations support the proposition that 
corporations must in some circumstances exercise their leverage over other actors in an effort to 
ameliorate situations to which they did not contribute?  
Some proponents of the sphere of influence approach suggest a simple equation: leverage—
understood in terms of a company’s size, scale of operations, profits, capacity, financial and human 
resources, strategic position in particular networks, privileged access to elites, etc.—equals 
responsibility, and the more leverage, the more responsibility. And size matters: the larger the 
company, “the larger the sphere of influence is likely to be” (United Nations 2005a: 14). The main 
author of the UN Draft Norms put it this way:  
the larger the resources of transnational and other businesses, the more opportunities they may 
have to assert influence. Accordingly, larger businesses, which generally engage in broader 
activities and enjoy more influence, have greater responsibility for promoting and protecting 
human rights. (Weissbrodt and Kruger 2003: 912) 
This view is also reflected in ISO 26000’s statement that “a high level of influence is likely to 
correspond to a high level of responsibility to exercise that influence” (International Organization for 
Standardization 2010: clause 6.4.3.2).  
Surely this is too simple. If this logic were taken literally it would mean that a large multinational 
company whose operations and value chain raise very few human rights issues would have greater 
responsibility than a small company operating in an industry and location with extremely high human 
rights risks, simply because of its greater resources. It would mean that a prosperous Canadian 
company with no operations, sources of supply, shareholders or consumers in Cambodia would have a 
responsibility to help improve the lot of Cambodian children, simply because it can. The SRSG 
objected in 2008 that this would turn the “ought implies can” principle on its head: 
Anchoring corporate responsibility in [leverage] requires assuming, in moral philosophy terms, 
that “can implies ought”. But companies cannot be held responsible for the human rights impacts 
of every entity over which they may have some influence, because this would include cases in 
which they were not a causal agent, direct or indirect, of the harm in question. (United Nations 
2008b: 19-20; see also United Nations 2008a: 5) 
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The SRSG addressed this issue again in his 2010 “operationalization” report, this time emphasizing 
not the absence of causal agency but the danger that leverage-based responsibility might push 
companies into performing roles that should be played by governments:  
Such attributes as companies’ size, influence or profit margins may be relevant factors in 
determining the scope of their promotional CSR activities, but they do not define the scope of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights. ... [T]he proposition that corporate human rights 
responsibilities as a general rule should be determined by companies’ capacity, whether absolute 
or relative to States, is troubling. On that premise, a large and profitable company operating in a 
small and poor country could soon find itself called upon to perform ever-expanding social and 
even governance functions – lacking democratic legitimacy, diminishing the State’s incentive to 
build sustainable capacity and undermining the company’s own economic role and possibly its 
commercial viability. Indeed, the proposition invites undesirable strategic gaming in any kind of 
country context. (United Nations 2010: 13-14) 
The danger of such strategic manipulation may be overstated (Wood, 2011), but the underlying point 
is sound: anchoring responsibility in leverage alone is highly problematic. “Can” does not imply 
“ought”.  
Sorell gives three convincing reasons why wealth and power are not, on their own, sources of 
responsibility. Firstly, a company need not be rich and powerful to discharge many human rights 
obligations (Sorell 2004: 139). Secondly, the risk of violating human rights and the difficulty of 
promoting or protecting them vary independently of companies’ wealth and power:  
Undifferentiated talk of business obligations to promote human rights, and images of businesses 
with no specific location in the world but bestriding the world, ignore the greater foreseeable risks 
of human rights violations that attend some places and some forms of business and the greater 
obligations of companies in those businesses and those places to attend to human rights problems. 
(ibid.)  
Thirdly, if companies’ human rights obligations are tied to their economic fortunes, a small business 
with a razor-thin profit margin might blamelessly neglect worker safety or suppress unionization, 
while a huge company that falls on hard times might lose its human rights obligations along with its 
wealth and power (ibid.). On the contrary, Sorell argues, “a company that loses its wealth and power 
retains its obligations but may become less and less able to discharge them” (ibid.). 
As a result, Sorell and the SRSG suggest that wealth, power and other indicia of leverage are 
relevant as means of discharging social responsibilities, not as sources of responsibility (Sorell 2004: 
139; United Nations 2011b: 14, 16, 18-19). I would not go this far. Leverage can be a source of 
responsibility, provided other factors are present. The leading example is the moral duty to come to the 
aid of those in distress (e.g., Griffin 2004: 39; Sorell 2004: 130-135; Moore 2009: 37).  
Good Samaritans 
The moral duty to come to the rescue of people in distress is an example of leverage-based 
responsibility. In such cases, leverage—understood as ability to help—is a prerequisite for 
responsibility, not simply a means of discharging it: someone who cannot swim is not under an 
obligation to save a drowning baby (Santoro 2010: 292). It is worth repeating Griffin’s affirmation that 
being in a position to help, even if entirely accidental, can impose moral responsibilities (2004: 39). 
Harm and suffering generate objective reasons for everyone to cut them short (Sorell 2004: 135; Nagel 
1986: 152-156).  
When will such reasons be sufficiently compelling to constitute a moral obligation on particular 
actors to help (Moore 2009: 37)? Speaking generally, four criteria must be satisfied: urgency, ability, 
opportunity and affordability (Archard 2004; Griffin 2004; Schmidtz 2000; Sorell 2004; Moore 2009: 
37). First, the situation must be urgent. Urgency is a function of the importance of the interest at stake 
(e.g., life, limb, or basic human rights) and the immediacy and severity of the threat to that interest. 
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Secondly, the putative helper must have the ability to help the person in distress, that is, the requisite 
knowledge, resources or experience to make a difference. Thirdly, the putative helper must have the 
opportunity to help, that is, must be in the right place at the right time to deliver the needed help. As 
Archard reminds us, there is a critical difference between ability and opportunity: 
I am able to administer First Aid to the victims of a road traffic accident. I can do so because I 
have secured the appropriate qualification, have the First Aid kit, know what I am doing, and have 
past experience of providing such help. However I only have the opportunity to render such aid if I 
am there when a traffic accident has taken place and there is a victim to whom I can give First Aid. 
(Archard 2004: 58) 
Some commentators add that the helper must be uniquely qualified to help—that is, there must be no 
one in a better position (Schmidtz 2000). Finally, the putative helper must be able to help at modest 
(some would say insignificant) cost, inconvenience or danger to himself or herself (Archard 2004: 35; 
Soule et al. 2009: 547-548).  
The duty to rescue applies to anyone and everyone who satisfies these conditions, including total 
strangers who are in a position to help purely by accident—whether passers-by who come upon a child 
flailing in a pond, tourists who witness a road accident while driving through a foreign country, or bar 
patrons who watch passively as a rape is committed in the bar (Moore 2009: 304). Since it applies to 
total strangers, it is appropriate that the duty be restricted to situations of urgent threats to fundamental 
interests, where the cost of helping is relatively small. 
There is a good argument that this duty applies to companies (Dunfee 2006; Griffin 2004; 
Schmidtz 2000; Sorell 2004; Soule et al. 2009: 547-548). Sorell gives the example of a company 
learning that, on its doorstep, “people's lives are being threatened, or their labour or land seized at the 
whim of the local military” (Sorell 2004: 132). The urgency of the victims’ needs and the relative 
scarcity of alternative help put “claims on the resources of the company, even if the company, like a 
passing tourist, is in no way responsible for the emergency” (Sorell 2004: 130). While the analogy 
between the individual bystander and the company is not perfect, the disanalogy adds force to the 
argument. Companies that invest directly in a country are more like permanent residents than tourists, 
as Sorell points out: 
What goes on in the country has more to do with them than with people who are quickly passing 
through. The human rights abuses that companies confront do not crop up suddenly and 
unexpectedly, like the road accident: they often predate the entry of the company and are known in 
advance to be features of local life. Again, they are not features of life which, like the accident on 
the road, can pass unnoticed if one’s eyes are averted at the right moment, or that can be kept at a 
distance by driving away. (Sorell 2004: 130)  
Sorell argues that companies “have obligations to help those whose lives or liberty are under serious 
threat in their vicinity, because some of these threats put people in urgent and undeniable need of help 
from anyone who can help, and companies in their vicinity sometimes can” (Sorell 2004: 133).  
The SRSG neither explicitly endorses nor rejects a business responsibility to come to the aid of 
those in distress. He recognizes that in some circumstances, “such as natural disasters or public health 
emergencies, there may be compelling reasons for any social actor with capacity to contribute 
temporarily” (United Nations 2010: 14), but he does not develop this idea further in his reports. He 
does explore the implications of a company’s presence in a place where human rights are being 
violated, but only in the context of defining the scope of complicity and due diligence. Firstly, he 
concludes that mere presence in a place where human rights violations are occurring does not usually 
by itself constitute complicity (United Nations 2008a: 12 & 21, 2008b: 21). The question of 
complicity, however, is not the same as the question whether presence “at the scene” can give rise to 
an independent responsibility to come to the aid of those in distress, and does not exhaust the potential 
moral relevance of such presence. If nothing else, the shaky moral and metaphysical ground on which 
the entire edifice of accomplice liability stands (Moore 2009: ch. 13) should lead us to explore other 
avenues.  
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The second context in which the SRSG discusses doing business in the presence of human rights 
violations is in defining the scope of human rights due diligence. Assessing human rights challenges in 
the specific country contexts where business activities take place is a key element of due diligence 
(United Nations 2008a: 7, 2008b: 17, 2011b: 17). The focus of such assessment, however, is on the 
potential human rights impacts of the company’s own activities. Operating in contexts where human 
rights abuses occur should raise “red flags” for companies to proceed with caution (United Nations 
2008a: 21), but does not on its own violate the responsibility to respect. Again, the question of the 
scope of due diligence is not the same as that of the existence of a free-standing responsibility to come 
to the aid of those in distress. Due diligence is the standard against which fulfillment of the 
responsibility to respect human rights is measured. Defining its content does not tell us whether there 
may be other duties beside the responsibility to respect.  
In conclusion, there are good arguments for the existence of a moral duty on corporations to aid the 
distressed when they find themselves in the position of capable bystanders, and nothing in the SRSG’s 
reports precludes such a responsibility, unless we read the SRSG’s definition of the responsibility to 
respect as exhausting business human rights obligations.  
Beyond rescue 
Even if we accept the existence of a business duty to aid the distressed, it is simultaneously to narrow 
and too broad to support my argument for a general leverage-based conception of social responsibility. 
It is too narrow because it applies only in situations of immediate and serious threat to such 
fundamental human interests as life and liberty. Under this logic, leverage-based responsibility would 
be limited to emergency situations which we can only hope will be marginal and exceptional. It would 
not apply in mainstream, routine business conditions, except in contexts where abuse of fundamental 
rights is the norm. On the other hand, it is too broad insofar as it applies to anyone and everyone in a 
position to help, including total strangers with no connection to the case aside from their fortuitous 
presence at a given time and place. Restricting the duty to narrowly defined emergencies is justified in 
light of the potentially unlimited range of duty-bearers, and the potentially unlimited range of duty-
bearers is justified by the urgency of the threats at issue. But there is a place for an intermediate form 
of leverage-based responsibility that is not restricted to dire threats to the most basic interests and does 
not extend potentially to everyone in the world.  
Responsibilities are determined by other moral considerations than just urgency and ability to help. 
The most important for my purposes is the prior existence of a relationship between the company, on 
one hand, and the human rights-holder or rights-violator on the other. By narrowing the range of 
potential duty-bearers to those with such a relationship, we are justified in broadening the 
circumstances in which leverage-based responsibility will arise. 
The SRSG himself points to this possibility. Recall that the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights recognize that business enterprises have a responsibility to “seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their 
business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts” (United Nations 2011b: 14, 
emphasis added) . In such cases the company should exercise any leverage it has to prevent or mitigate 
the adverse impact. If it lacks leverage it should explore ways to increase its leverage by, for example, 
offering capacity-building to the related entity or collaborating with other actors. If it lacks leverage 
and is unable to increase its leverage it should consider ending the relationship, taking into account the 
potential adverse human rights impacts of doing so, the importance of the relationship to the company 
and the severity of the abuse. “As long as the abuse continues and the enterprise remains in the 
relationship,” the Guidelines warn, “it should be able to demonstrate its own ongoing efforts to 
mitigate the impact and be prepared to accept any consequences – reputational, financial or legal – of 
the continuing connection” (United Nations 2011b: 19).  
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As I showed earlier, this is an example of leverage-based responsibility as I define the term, despite 
the SRSG’s earlier rejection of leverage as a basis for determining the scope of corporate 
responsibility. Responsibility attaches to the company’s ability to influence other actors through its 
relationships, rather than to its contribution to negative impacts, since it is not making any such 
contribution. The key factor giving rise to responsibility in this situation is the “direct link” between 
the enterprise’s operations, products or services, on one hand, and human rights impacts, on the other, 
via its business relationships. The Guiding Principles are silent on what constitutes a “direct link.” One 
of my goals in this article is to specify what kind of link should suffice to ground this form of 
responsibility, putting some flesh on the bones provided by the Guiding Principles. I consider this 
issue next, as one of four criteria for the imposition of leverage-based responsibility.  
Criteria for leverage-based responsibility 
I argue that leverage-based responsibility arises when four criteria are satisfied: (a) there is a morally 
significant connection between the company and either the perpetrator of human rights abuse or the 
human rights-holder, (b) the company is able to make a difference to the state of affairs, (c) it can do 
so at an acceptable cost to itself, and (d) the actual or potential invasion of human rights at issue is 
substantial.  
(a) Morally significant connection 
The first criterion for the existence of a responsibility to exercise leverage is a morally significant 
connection between the company, on one hand, and the human rights holder or rights violator on the 
other. In the basic rescue cases the connection is provided by the urgency of the victim’s plight and the 
rescuer’s being in the right place at the right time with the right resources. This connection crystallizes 
only at the moment these factors coincide. Often, however, there is a pre-existing relationship between 
a company and either the rights-holder or the perpetrator of harm, and this relationship can provide a 
morally significant connection sufficient to generate a broader leverage-based responsibility. For 
individuals, such relationships may be constituted by love, affection, friendship, vulnerability, family, 
employment or business; or by shared experiences, places, values, beliefs, interests, etc. Although 
corporations are not capable of some of these connections they have myriad commercial, contractual, 
political, cultural and other links to a wide variety of actors. Like individuals, they have relationships 
with and “deep commitments to particular persons, causes, careers, and institutions” (Griffin 2004: 
40). They may be tied by investments and commercial relations to a place where human rights abuses 
are taking place, and they may depend on the services or good will of those who are guilty of the 
abuses (Sorell 2004: 130). Some of these connections are created by choice, others arise involuntarily. 
Some are known to the parties, others are not.  
These relationships generate moral responsibilities. The closer the relationship, the stronger the 
responsibility (Santoro 2010: 292). At the “closer” end of the spectrum are what Moore (2009, 58) 
refers to as “obligations to the near and dear”. Applied to companies this would likely include 
employees, on-site contractors, consumers of goods and services, direct suppliers, and the 
communities in which companies operate (Goodpaster 2010: 134). If a company is blatantly and 
systematically polluting water supplies, exploiting workers or intimidating union organizers in a 
particular local community, other companies who are also established in that community have a 
stronger moral obligation to exercise their leverage to get it to desist than companies with no presence 
there, all else being equal. When public authorities interfere with employees’ rights to assembly or 
expression or take away their land without due process, their employer has a stronger responsibility to 
intervene than does a stranger. Where security forces use a company’s products to commit human 
rights violations, or where individuals use a company’s products (e.g., cough syrups, adhesives, 
solvents, fuels) to get high, the maker of the product has a stronger responsibility to do something 
about it than does a company that does not make such products. A company with operations in a 
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specific developing country, employing its inhabitants and contributing to its economy, has more of a 
responsibility for human rights in that country than it does in a country in which it does no business, 
and more responsibility than does a company that has no operations in that country (Archard 2004: 
58). 
Responsibility is not determined solely by the closeness of the relationship to the rights-holder or 
rights-infringer. The character of the interest at stake also matters. The closer the connection between 
the interest that is threatened and the company’s activities, products or services, the stronger the 
responsibility. A company has a stronger responsibility to exercise leverage over public officials who 
interfere with its employees’ rights of expression when the subject of such expression concerns the 
company itself or its economic sector, than when it concerns something completely unrelated to the 
company, its operations, activities, products, or services. This point can be understood in terms of 
relevance: the more relevant the interest at stake to the company’s activities, products or services, the 
stronger the responsibility (Sorell 2004: 133). 
I have identified two types of connections that can be morally significant: the company’s 
relationship to the person(s) involved and the relevance of the interests at stake to the company’s 
activities, products and services. Either can be sufficient on its own to generate leverage-based 
responsibility. If the relationship to the rights-holder or violator is close enough, responsibility will 
arise regardless of whether the interest at stake concerns the company’s activities, products or services. 
This might be the case, for example, when public authorities or security contractors kill or menace a 
company’s long-time employee for reasons unconnected to the company, such as the employee’s 
alleged political activities; or when a company is so pivotal to a local economy that the taxes and 
royalties it pays provide a substantial portion of the government’s revenue which is then used to 
repress civil rights. Obversely, if the connection between the interest at stake and the company’s 
activities, products or services is close enough, responsibility will arise even if the relationship 
between the company and the rights-holder or violator is weak (as, for example, in the case of the 
glue-sniffing addicts). Responsibility will be strongest where both types of connection are strong, and 
weak or non-existent where both are weak or absent.  
So, for example, a Norwegian oil company with operations in Nigeria does not have a 
responsibility to protest a Nigerian court’s sentencing of a young woman to death by stoning in a 
different state in which the company has no investments, operations, suppliers or consumers, provided 
it has no relationship with the case or parties and the case does not concern in any way its activities or 
products, or those of the oil industry generally (Bomann-Larsen 2004: 95). Likewise, to cite Lord 
Macaulay’s famous example, “a surgeon need not take a train from Calcutta to Meerut in order to save 
someone not his patient, even though unless the doctor takes the train that person will die” (Moore 
2009: 58-59). 
The relationships and connections that form the basis for this form of responsibility are often 
multiple and interwoven. In any given human rights risk situation, a company might have relationships 
with workers, labour unions, contractors, suppliers, customers, subsidiaries, affiliates, consumers, 
local residents, security forces, national public authorities, local governments, competitors, industry 
associations, non-governmental organizations and more; and the human rights risks at play might be 
relevant to one or more of the company’s product lines, services, production methods, labour 
practices, or political activities. The metaphor of a “web of relationships,” suggested by the SRSG, is 
apt for describing this interconnecting, networked reality. Even if no single strand in the web is strong 
enough on its own, responsibility will still arise if the company’s relationships with rights-holders or 
violators and the relevance of the interests at stake to its activities, products or services, taken together, 
constitute a significant connection. The determination of a morally significant connection should be 
holistic, considering all the relevant strands in the company’s web of relationships. 
The general idea I am advancing here, that a company’s relationships provide the morally 
significant connection giving rise to responsibility, is reflected in the Guiding Principles. They state 
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that responsibility arises where a business enterprise has not contributed to an adverse human rights 
impact, “but that impact is nevertheless directly linked to its operations, products or services by its 
business relationship with another entity” (United Nations 2011b: 18). “Business relationships” 
include “relationships with business partners, entities in its value chain, and any other non-State or 
State entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services” (ibid., 14). This is 
potentially too restrictive in two ways. First, there is no reason to think that morally significant 
connections will be restricted to “business” relationships, if this term is understood as excluding 
“political,” “social” or “cultural” relationships. ISO 26000 is on a better track insofar as it speaks of 
“political, contractual, economic or other relationships” (International Organization for 
Standardization 2010: clause 2.19). Secondly, the insistence on a “direct link” to the company’s 
operations, products or services is too restrictive if it excludes cases where the connection is mediated 
through more than one interlinked relationship (for example, via two or three tiers of suppliers or 
contractors). The SRSG’s effort to delimit the connection is important, so that responsibility is not all-
encompassing. But this connection can arise in two ways, as I have argued: either via the relationship 
between the company and the rights-holder or violator, or via the link between the company’s 
activities, products and services and the interest at stake. The Guiding Principles’ “direct link” 
criterion appears to conflate these two kinds of connection, and potentially to draw the line around 
responsibility too close to the company, excluding some morally significant connections.  
It would, however, be inappropriate to draw the line too far from a company. O’Neill (1985, 1996: 
99) argues, for example, that a moral agent has obligations to everyone whose actions the agent 
presupposes in conducting his or her own activity. Thus “when I buy a sweatshirt or a pair of shoes, 
my action presupposes the actions of all the persons connected with the process that transforms raw 
materials into clothes and brings them to my local store” (Young 2004: 372). As Young 
acknowledges, this approach might be appropriate for a collective form of responsibility, but it is too 
all-encompassing for fixing the responsibilities of individual actors (Young 2004). My approach 
reaches for middle ground, by focusing on the dual factors of a company’s connection to the rights-
holder or violator and the relevance of the interest at stake to the company’s activities, products or 
services.  
The existence of a morally significant connection also satisfies or partially substitutes for the 
opportunity criterion that usually applies in rescue cases. A special relationship to the rights-holder or 
violator or a strong link to the company’s activities, products or services, or both, provides the 
company with the opportunity to act. It is what puts the company in “the right place at the right time” 
to exercise whatever leverage it has to ameliorate the situation. 
To sum up this part, the existence of a morally significant connection between the company and the 
rights-holder or violator is a prerequisite for leverage-based responsibility. Such connection can be 
created by a pre-existing relationship between the company and the person(s) involved, or the 
relevance of the interest at stake to the company’s activities, products or services, or both. The 
stronger these connections, the stronger the company’s responsibility. As Arnold (2010: 387) and 
many others point out, where special relationships exist in the global economy, rights-claims are 
binding on specific obligation bearers; and wherever corporations do business they are already in 
special relationships with a variety of stakeholders, such as workers, customers, and local 
communities. These special connections are the fulcrum of my argument for leverage-based 
responsibility. To paraphrase Griffin (2004: 40), unless one stresses these connections, my proposal 
that ability (ie., leverage) can determine where responsibility lies looks distinctly odd. 
(b) Ability 
As Campbell (2004a: 15) reminds us, companies’ ability “to make a difference to fundamental human 
interests within and beyond their own core sphere of activity” is an essential factor in determining 
their human rights duties. In line with this observation, the second criterion for leverage-based 
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responsibility is the company’s ability to make a difference by exercising influence over others with 
whom it has relationships. As with the first criterion, the strength of responsibility varies with this 
ability. The greater the actor’s chance of being effective and the greater its capacity to absorb the cost 
of action, the stronger the correlative responsibility (Santoro 2010: 292).  
As in the basic rescue case, ability is a prerequisite for responsibility, not simply a means of 
discharging it. Unlike in the basic rescue scenario, however, the standard by which the requisite ability 
is judged is relatively low. In the basic rescue situation, a high degree of ability is usually required for 
a duty to arise. According to some commentators, the duty to rescue arises only if the putative rescuer 
is uniquely qualified to relieve the sufferer’s plight and success is more or less assured within a limited 
time (Soule et al. 2009: 547-548). This high standard may be justified when imposing moral 
responsibilities on total strangers who are in a position to help purely by accident. When the range of 
duty-bearers is limited by the requirement of a separate, morally significant connection, a lower 
threshold is appropriate. It is also appropriate in light of the reality, discussed earlier, that the 
individual outcome control presumed by the higher threshold is rare in our complex contemporary 
world. The standard should therefore be that the company has the ability to make an appreciable 
contribution to ameliorating the situation over the short, medium or long term by exercising leverage 
through its relationships, not that it has a high probability of solving the problem by itself in a limited 
time.  
Furthermore, the relevant question is whether the company has the ability to make a difference not 
just by itself but in combination with others. Moore (2009: 304) cites a case in which bar patrons 
passively watched a rape, concluding that the patrons “had the ability to prevent the rape and did not, 
and that is sufficient to ground their responsibility”. Imagine that no single patron could have stopped 
the rape alone. This does not mean that none of them had a responsibility to act. On the contrary, they 
had a responsibility to make an effort to get other patrons to act jointly to stop the rape. Their ability to 
make a difference together gave rise to a duty to use their leverage over others toward that end.  
The relationships through which companies can exercise leverage are sometimes the same 
relationships that establish the morally significant connection to the rights-holder or the perpetrator of 
abuse, sometimes not. For example, a morally significant connection may be established by the 
company’s relationship to its workers or local community members, while leverage may be exercise 
through the company’s relationship to public authorities, industry associations or competitors.  
(c) Affordability 
The third criterion is that the company can make its contribution to ameliorating the situation at an 
acceptable cost to itself. In the basic rescue scenario there is a duty to rescue only if the cost and 
inconvenience to the rescuer are insignificant or small (Dunfee 2006; Griffin 2004: 35, 39; Moore 
2009: 37, 59; Schmidtz 2000). Soule et al. (2009: 548) insist that the cost must “not disrupt the 
business, significantly impact earnings, or compromise other moral obligations,” concluding not 
surprisingly that the duty will arise rarely in a business context. As with the other criteria, however, it 
is appropriate to relax this criterion when the range of potential duty bearers is limited by the prior 
existence of a morally significant connection to the rights-bearer or rights-violator. Where there is a 
special relationship, we can reasonably expect the duty bearer to incur somewhat more cost, 
inconvenience and risk than we would expect of the total stranger. Moreover, the cost we can expect 
the company to absorb will increase both with the strength of its morally significant connection to the 
state of affairs and with its ability to make a difference (Santoro 2010: 292). 
As with the first two criteria, determining affordability is more a question of identifying a 
continuum than drawing a sharp line. The basic rescue principle is at the low end of the continuum, 
with its insistence on little or no cost to the rescuer. At the other extreme is the proposition that the 
rescuer must incur any cost consistent with mere survival as an agent (Griffin 2004: 35). As Griffin 
argues, the former standard is too lax, the latter too demanding. In his view the answer to the question 
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of what cost is acceptable “is inevitably rough, but it is along these lines: at a cost within the capacities 
of the sort of persons we should want there to be” (ibid.: 36). These sorts of persons—including 
companies and their managers—would not be utterly impartial, rather they would be committed to 
specific goals, institutions, relationships, places and people, willing to sacrifice themselves but only up 
to a point. Their obligation to exercise leverage does not go on until the their marginal loss equals the 
marginal gain of those they are helping; on the contrary, they are allowed substantially to honour their 
own commitments and follow their own interests, and these permissions limit their obligations (ibid.: 
40). Perhaps the most we can say is that companies have a responsibility to make reasonable efforts at 
modest risk or cost to themselves (Sorell 2004: 132, 135), and that the cost they are expected to incur 
will increase with the strength of their morally significant connection to the state of affairs in question.  
(d) Urgency 
The final criterion for the existence of leverage-based responsibility is a substantial threat to or 
infringement of a human right. Once again, given the requirement of an independent morally 
significant connection to the rights-holder or rights-infringer, we are justified in relaxing the urgency 
criterion relative to that which would apply in a basic rescue scenario. Instead of an immediate threat 
to fundamental rights to life, limb, liberty or basic subsistence—a threat that generates objective 
reasons for anyone who can to help the affected people—it is sufficient that there be a substantial 
threat to or interference with any human right. It is not my task to catalogue every human right for 
which business enterprises are responsible. My task, like the SRSG’s, is to define companies’ 
responsibilities in relation to all human rights (United Nations 2008b: 14-15). An immediate threat to a 
fundamental human interest is therefore not a minimum threshold for leverage-based responsibility to 
arise, but a factor enhancing the strength of the responsibility. The more fundamental the interest at 
stake and the more severe the harm to that interest, the stronger the responsibility.  
Characteristics of leverage-based responsibility 
Four implications follow from my argument: that leverage-based responsibility is qualified, not 
categorical; graduated rather than binary; context-specific; and both negative and positive in character. 
Moreover, it is practicable and appropriate to the specialized social function of business. 
(e) Leverage-based responsibility is qualified, not categorical 
One implication of my analysis is that leverage-based responsibility is qualified. It is a responsibility 
to make a reasonable effort to influence the behaviour of relevant others through relationships, rather 
than to achieve defined social interaction outcomes. As Goodpaster (2010: 147) argues, “even if a 
company does not have a categorical responsibility, a responsibility to resolve the moral challenge on 
its own, it can still have a qualified responsibility to make an effort—or to participate in the efforts of 
others in seeking a collaborative resolution”. This follows from the lack of individual outcome control 
in contemporary social interaction and is consistent with the “ought implies can” maxim, which 
demands that responsibilities be defined in terms of results that are within the capacity of moral agents 
to achieve.  
The Guiding Principles reflect this differentiation. Impact-based responsibility is defined in terms 
of expected outcomes, while leverage-based responsibility is defined in terms of efforts. Companies 
have a responsibility to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts (impact-based 
responsibility), but where they are not contributing to impacts, their responsibility is limited to seeking 
to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services 
(leverage-based responsibility) (United Nations 2011b: 14).  
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(f) Leverage-based responsibility is graduated, not binary 
A second implication is that leverage-based responsibility is a matter of degree, not an “on/off” 
choice. The strength of responsibility varies positively with the strength of the company’s morally 
significant connection to the state of affairs in question, its leverage over other actors, and the 
seriousness of the threat to or infringement of human rights, and negatively with the cost of exercising 
leverage. The threshold between no responsibility and responsibility is necessarily broad and 
indistinct. It is defined not by a bright line but by a combination of open-textured standards: a morally 
significant connection; the ability to make an appreciable contribution at modest cost; and a substantial 
human rights threat. Paraphrasing what Moore (2009: 105) says of the “substantial factor” test for 
causation, responsibility is a matter of degree and the break point between no responsibility and 
responsibility is often arbitrary; the job of a business responsibility framework is to set an 
appropriately vague line below which one’s connection to the rights-holder or violator, one’s leverage 
over relevant others, the cost of exercising leverage, and the threat to human rights will be ignored for 
purposes of assessing responsibility. It is worth noting that impact-based responsibility is also 
graduated, since culpability, causation and non-causal contributions are also matters of degree (Moore 
2009: 72, 300, 319-320); but this issue is beyond the scope of my argument. 
Not only is there graduation within leverage-based responsibility, there is also graduation between 
leverage-based and impact-based responsibility. All else being equal, a company bears greater 
responsibility for human rights harms it has caused than those to which it has contributed causally or 
non-causally (e.g. by omission or risk imposition); and more for problems to which it has contributed 
than for those to which it has not, but could help solve. The SRSG recognized this when he wrote that 
the steps a company takes to address the human rights impacts of its own operations may differ from 
those regarding its relationships with other social actors, and that its actions regarding the human 
rights impact of a subsidiary may differ from those in response to impacts of suppliers several layers 
removed (United Nations 2008a: 8). These distinctions are reflected in the Guiding Principles. 
Responsibility requires different action depending on whether the company (a) causes or may cause 
human rights impacts, (b) contributes or may contribute to human rights impacts, or (c) does not 
contribute to impacts but such impacts are nevertheless directly linked to it via its business 
relationships. In the first situation (causation), the company’s responsibility is stringent: to take the 
necessary steps to stop or prevent the impact. In the second (contribution), it is relaxed somewhat: to 
take the necessary steps to stop or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate any 
remaining impact to the greatest extent possible. In the third, its responsibility is relaxed even farther: 
it should exercise its leverage, if it has any; seek ways to increase its leverage, if it has none; and if it 
can do neither, it should consider ending the relationship, taking into account the importance of the 
relationship to company, the severity of the human rights impacts of the relationship, and the potential 
human rights impacts of ending it (United Nations 2011b: 18-19). This differentiation reflects the 
realization that when responsibility is imposed in the absence of contribution to a given state of affairs, 
it is not appropriate to demand that a company remedy the state of affairs, but it is appropriate to 
demand that it make reasonable efforts to influence those over whom it has some leverage (for 
example, by making representations to local officials or home country diplomats) (Sorell 2004: 132). 
(g) Leverage-based responsibility is context-specific 
Although corporate human rights obligations are defined in terms of universal human rights to which 
all individuals are equally entitled, their concrete content must be determined in relation to a range of 
contextual factors including the responsible actor’s social functions, relationships, impacts, 
capabilities and environment (Cragg 2010: 272, 289-296). So although the Guiding Principles insist 
that the responsibility to respect human rights applies fully and equally to all business enterprises 
regardless of context (United Nations 2011b: 14), the reality is that at any level of concrete detail that 
has application to actual situations, corporate human rights obligations mean very different things in 
different contexts (Campbell 2004a: 19).  
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(h) Leverage-based responsibility is both negative and positive 
The same moral considerations supporting leverage-based responsibility in general also support 
positive responsibility. The morally significant connection between the company and the rights-holder 
or rights-infringer, and the ability to contribute to improving the rights-holder’s situation, generate not 
just a negative responsibility to use leverage to avoid or mitigate the negative impacts of other actors 
with whom the company has relationships, but also a positive responsibility to use leverage to enhance 
the positive social or environmental impacts of other actors with whom the company has relationships, 
even though the company did nothing to cause or contribute to the current state of affairs (Wettstein 
2010a). As Wettstein argues (against Hsieh 2009), such positive obligations cannot be grounded 
convincingly in a negative responsibility to do no harm, but entail a positive responsibility to protect 
human rights (Wettstein 2010c).  
The idea that corporations have positive human rights obligations—to protect, promote or fulfill 
human rights—is increasingly prevalent in business and human rights theory and practice despite the 
UN Framework’s rejection of it. Arnold (2009: 66; see also 2010: 387), for example, asserts that 
corporations “have obligations to both ensure that they do not illegitimately undermine the liberty of 
any persons, and the additional obligation to help ensure that minimal welfare rights to physical well-
being and the development of basic human capacities are met within their sphere of influence”. Cragg 
(2010: 289) claims that the task of the corporation in areas without well-defined human rights laws “is 
to mitigate the negative human rights impacts of its activities and enhance positive impacts”. ISO 
26000 and the UN Global Compact are two high profile examples from the realm of practice that 
embrace both negative and positive corporate responsibility. 
I do not attempt a systematic defence of positive corporate human rights responsibilities here. My 
objective is simply to suggest that the moral considerations giving rise to leverage-based responsibility 
also support positive responsibility. Nor do I claim that my account exhausts the positive 
responsibilities of corporations, which might alternatively be grounded in multinational corporations’ 
political authority (Kobrin 2009; Wettstein 2010b, 2010c) or in basic Kantian deontological ethics 
(Arnold 2009: 66); but these possibilities are beyond the scope of my inquiry. 
(i) Leverage-based responsibility satisfies the practicality criterion 
Any account of corporate human rights obligations must fulfill the criterion of practicality (Archard 
2004; Campbell 2004a, 2004b: 35; Cragg 2010; Griffin 2004). At one level this means that the 
obligations must be within the capacity of the individual obligation bearer to carry out, an issue I have 
already addressed. It also means that the obligations must be capable of being embedded, 
operationalized and enforced in a concrete institutional framework. My account of leverage-based 
responsibility satisfies this requirement. Human rights in general are already concretely 
institutionalized via many international and national instruments, agencies and tribunals. They have “a 
tangible, palpable existence, which gives them a social objectivity in an institutional facticity” 
(Campbell 2004a: 12). Moreover, the UN Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights go a long way toward providing a concrete framework to institutionalize the human rights 
obligations of business, both within individual companies and at a broader institutional level. The 
Guiding Principles may contemplate a narrower form of leverage-based responsibility than I do, but 
the concrete processes they propose for assessing human rights impacts, exercising or enhancing 
leverage, ending relationships and providing remedies is, to a first approximation, suitable for the 
broader responsibility I propose.  
Vagueness is the only serious objection that might be raised against my account of leverage-based 
responsibility under the heading of practicality. How can companies and other actors implement, 
monitor and enforce obligations based upon such open-textured standards as “significant,” 
“appreciable,” “modest” and “substantial”? One answer is that they do so routinely in other fields, 
from financial disclosure to environmental impact assessment to risk management to negligence 
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liability. In the field of human rights, as in these other fields, the open texture of rules and standards is 
demanded by the moral characteristics of the phenomena at issue. As I have shown, the criteria giving 
rise to leverage-based responsibility are continuous rather than dichotomous, and the resulting 
responsibility is a matter of degree, not an on-off switch. Furthermore, many—perhaps most—of the 
human rights to which business human rights responsibilities correspond are themselves vague and 
open-textured. To the extent that this prevents satisfaction of the practicality requirement, this 
impugns all accounts of business human rights responsibilities, not just mine.  
The inherent open-endedness of human rights responsibilities calls for attention to the practical 
tools and processes by which such responsibilities can be operationalized, a task on which the SRSG’s 
reports, ISO 26000, the UN Global Compact and other initiatives have already made progress (e.g., 
Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights (no date); United Nations Global Compact Office and 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004, 2007). And it calls for 
recognition that allocation of human rights responsibility, like the identification of a “substantial 
causal factor” in law, has an irreducible element of arbitrariness that may conflict with what many 
writers on human rights think (Griffin 2004: 40; Moore 2009: 105). This is as true of the General 
Principles’ “direct link” criterion as it is of my account of leverage-based responsibility. This 
arbitrariness can be moderated by operational guidance and institutional practice, but not eliminated.  
Leverage-based corporate human rights responsibilities can be and are being embedded in stable, 
recurring, rule-governed patterns of behaviour, incorporated in corporate management systems, 
integrated in business operations, monitored, reported and verified (Cragg 2010: 292). It is beyond the 
scope of this article to provide a detailed prescription for this process of institutionalization; all I claim 
to do here is to make a prima facie case that it is possible.  
(j) Leverage-based responsibility is appropriate to the social function of business 
One of the SRSG’s strongest objections to leverage as a basis for allocating responsibility was that it 
would be inconsistent with the specialized social function of business enterprises. If responsibility 
arises from leverage, he warned, “a large and profitable company operating in a small and poor 
country could soon find itself called upon to perform ever-expanding social and even governance 
functions – lacking democratic legitimacy, diminishing the State’s incentive to build sustainable 
capacity and undermining the company’s own economic role and possibly its commercial viability” 
(United Nations 2010: 14). Corporations are “specialized economic organs, not democratic public 
interest institutions” and as such, “their responsibilities cannot and should not simply mirror the duties 
of States” (United Nations 2008b: 15; see also Arnold 2010: 374; Cragg 2010: 287; Drucker 1994).  
This might have been a valid complaint against the Draft UN Norms and some of the more 
grandiose applications of the “sphere of influence” approach in which corporate spheres of influence 
and activity provided the only distinction between business and governmental human rights duties, but 
it does not apply to my proposal for leverage-based responsibility. My requirement of a context-
specific, morally significant connection between the company and the rights-holder or perpetrator of 
human rights harm, like the Guiding Principles’ “direct link” criterion, limits the scope of 
responsibility and prevents corporations from being called upon, or taking it upon themselves, to 
become surrogate governments for entire communities or regions. Business enterprises exist primarily 
to pursue private interests, generating wealth for their owners by satisfying demands for goods and 
services. By restricting their human rights responsibilities to cases where they have a special 
relationship with the perpetrator or rights-claimant, or where the human rights risk situation is relevant 
to their activities, products or services, my approach ensures that their responsibility flows from their 
social role as business enterprises, not simply from their capacity to protect or fulfill human rights. 
It is important also to emphasize that leverage-based responsibilities, like business human rights 
obligations generally, do not arise due to a failure by states to fulfill their own responsibilities. They 
arise independently, due to moral considerations that make businesses obligation-bearers in their own 
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right (Sorell 2004: 141). Furthermore, the state’s responsibility to protect human rights is independent 
of these business responsibilities, and its failure to fulfill its own responsibility is not excused in the 
least by companies’ actions to fulfill theirs. Finally, if the concern is that firms might misuse their 
leverage to usurp governments and democratic processes, surely this would be inconsistent with social 
responsibility however defined. Social responsibility implies responsible involvement in politics and 
public policy (e.g., International Organization for Standardization 2010: clause 6.6.4). There is no 
question that abuses occur, but there is also no question that companies are capable of exercising their 
political influence responsibly. A framework for business human rights responsibility should demand 
that companies do so, rather than assuming that they will not.  
As for the SRSG’s concern about leverage-based responsibility undermining a company’s 
commercial viability, this is resolved by the criterion of modest cost. Leverage-based responsibility 
arises only if and to the extent that the cost to the company of exercising leverage is modest relative to 
the closeness of the connection to the rights-holder or violator, the severity of the human rights threat, 
and the company’s capacity. By definition, therefore, leverage-based responsibility may not force a 
company out of business. The same is not true, however, of impact-based responsibility. Where a 
company is causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts or has the potential to do so, and 
the price of avoiding or remedying such impacts is to cease doing business, the company must cease 
doing business—in that place, in that way, or altogether. A corporation has no right to “life” 
equivalent to that of an individual. It is not a living organism. This fact, plus its lack of a conscious 
mind or physical body and its potentially immortality, distinguish it in moral terms from individuals. 
Despite some commentators’ claims to the contrary (e.g., Archard 2004: 57-58), a corporation can and 
should be expected to take actions that would put it out of business, if such actions are required to 
fulfill its moral obligation not to cause or contribute to adverse human rights impacts. This distinction 
between impact-and leverage-based responsibility is justified by the greater moral blameworthiness 
attached to causing or contributing to harm (Moore 2009), and the correspondingly weaker moral 
imperative to exercise leverage over others to improve a state of affairs not of one’s own making.  
Conclusion 
The contemporary debate about corporate leverage emerged mainly in response to the sphere of 
influence (“SOI”) approach to corporate responsibility. The SOI metaphor is seriously flawed and 
should be replaced with one more apt such as a “web of relationships”, but the idea of leverage as a 
determinant of human rights responsibility should be preserved alongside impact-based responsibility. 
Leverage, understood as a company’s ability to contribute to improving a situation by exercising 
influence over other actors through its relationships, is a consideration in determining who bears 
corporate human rights obligations. It is not simply a means of discharging responsibility, but can be a 
source of responsibility where (a) there is a morally significant connection between the company and a 
rights-holder or rights-violator due either to a relationship to the person or the relevance of the rights-
holder’s interest to the company’s activities, products or services; (b) the company is able, on its own 
or with others, to make an appreciable contribution to ameliorating the situation by exercising leverage 
through its relationships; (c) it can do so at modest cost, relative to its resources and the strength of its 
morally significant connection to the state of affairs; and (d) the threat to the rights-holder’s human 
rights is substantial. In such circumstances companies have a responsibility to exercise their leverage 
and will be answerable for their exercise or failure to exercise such leverage even though they did 
nothing to contribute to the existing state of affairs. This responsibility is qualified, graduated, context-
specific, practicable, and consistent with the specialized social role of business. Moreover, it is not 
merely a negative responsibility to exercise leverage to avoid or reduce harm, but also a positive 
responsibility to protect, promote and fulfill human rights.  
The Guiding Principles go part of the way toward recognizing leverage-based responsibility, but 
they restrict it too narrowly and fail to articulate the meaning of the “direct link” between adverse 
impacts and the company’s activities, products or services. This article is an effort to put leverage-
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based responsibility on firmer normative ground and to elaborate its characteristics, including the 
nature of the required link. Ultimately, as I have tried to show, while the distinction between impact 
and leverage is morally significant, it is the strength of the connections constituted by a company’s 
web of activities and relationships that does most of the moral work in setting the scope of corporate 
human rights responsibilities.  
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